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Abstract 
When and how do social movements form to mobilize action across national boundaries? In 
the context of the 2015 movement to support Syrian refugees, we develop an integrative 
model of transnational social movement formation shaped by pre-existing world-views (SDO 
and RWA) and social media exposure to iconic events, resulting in an emergent group 
consciousness (“we are”, “we believe”, “we feel”). Group consciousness is, in turn, the 
proximal predictor of solidarity with refugees. Participants were from six countries: Hungary 
(N=267), Romania (N=163), Germany (N=190), the United Kingdom (N=159), the United 
States (N=244) and Australia (N=344). Multi-group structural equation models confirmed 
that group consciousness, shaped by individual differences and exposure to events through 
social media, was the proximal predictor of solidarity. The subjective meaning of group 
consciousness varied across samples, reflecting national differences. Results support the 
importance of considering individual and national differences, and group processes in 
understanding emergent social movements.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: social movements, social identity, emotion, ideology, solidarity, collective action, 
culture  
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How Social Movements Mobilize Action Within and Across Nations to Promote 
Solidarity with Refugees 
“Social psychological models of collective action in one sense offer compelling 
explanations for collective action and protest, but in another sense explain little about 
the actual emergence of action.” (Livingstone, 2014, p.124-125)  
Over the last five years, the world has witnessed waves of social change movements 
that have crossed national boundaries, such as the Arab Spring (McGarty, Thomas, Lala, 
Smith, & Bliuc, 2014), the movement to arrest Ugandan war criminal Joseph Kony 
(Kony2012; Thomas et al., 2015), and the Occupy movement (Smith, Gavin, & Sharp, 2015). 
This paper focuses on a recent, widespread, transnational social movement. In 2015, 
following years of extreme suffering by refugees, especially those escaping conflicts in Syria 
and Iraq, there was a widespread increase in efforts by members of the global community to 
address the plight of refugees, especially those seeking asylum in Europe (Timson, 2015). 
The increased support for refugees appeared to occur immediately after the widespread social 
media dissemination of images of the body of a Syrian child, Aylan Kurdi, washed ashore on 
a Turkish beach on September 15, 2015 (Vis & Goriunova, 2015). The image was popularly 
shared through social media and is credited with playing an important role in the dramatic 
social and political changes that ensued (Slovic, Västfjäll, Erlandsson, & Gregory, 2017).  
Social psychological science is in a strong position to explain why people participate 
in such social movements. As van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears (2008) showed, people will 
act together to support a cause they are committed to, when they perceive that something is 
wrong, and that they believe can succeed. However, social psychology has been less 
successful in explaining when these movements will form and how they do so (Livingstone, 
2014, above). When does a stance, trend or thread of opinion become a social movement that 
provides a basis for united action? Similarly, current empirical and theoretical approaches to 
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collective action are not well equipped to explain international, global, cross-cultural 
expressions of collective action (van Zomeren & Louis, 2017). How do individual differences 
in worldviews about how the world should be intersect with exposure to iconic events to 
generate a social movement spanning many nations?  
The current paper takes up these challenges. We adopt an integrative approach, 
informed by the framework provided by Duncan’s (2012) integrated model of personality 
and social psychological theories of collective action, to address these questions about the 
emergence of the global solidarity movement to support Syrian refugees. We report on the 
findings from six nations (Hungary, Romania, Germany, the UK, the US, Australia) sampled 
in the immediate aftermath of the response to the image of Aylan Kurdi.   
An Integrative Model of Solidarity with Refugees 
The current research builds upon the framework provided by Duncan’s integrative 
model of collective action to develop a model of solidarity with refugees. Duncan’s (2012) 
integrated model brings together research into the role of personality and life experiences in 
precipitating involvment in social movements, with current theorizing in social psychology 
about why people engage in collective action. Specifically, the integrated model posits that 
key individual differences and life experiences act as antecedents to the formation of a group 
consciousness which, in turn, is the proximal predictor of collective action. We adapt this 
framework to explore the rapid emergence of transnational solidarity with refugees witnessed 
in October-November 2015.  
Figure 1 provides a conceptual overview of our hypotheses. It shows that we conceive 
of the solidarity movement (“outcomes”) as both psychological, reflecting a sense in which 
members of advantaged nations “stand with” those in the disadvantaged group (in this case, 
refugees); and behavioral, reflecting concerted actions to change the circumstances of a 
disadvantaged group (by taking solidarity-based collective action; Saab et al., 2015; Thomas, 
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Mavor & McGarty, 2012). When people discuss solidarity they often invoke spatial 
metaphors: you “stand with” another, or you are “in solidarity” (e.g., Meadows, 2007), and 
this sense of shared fate with the disadvantaged group is key to current models of political 
solidarity (Subašić, Reynolds & Turner, 2008). Moreover, the key defining feature of this 
movement was that the popular support shown for the refugees through social media were 
instrumental in promoting the political changes that ensued (see Slovic et al., 2017; Vis & 
Goriunova, 2015). Accordingly, we conceive of solidarity also as including a set of behaviors 
designed to advance the circumstances of a disadvantaged group (i.e., donating, advocating, 
volunteering; see Kende, Lantos, Belinszky, Csaba & Lukács, 2017; Saab et al., 2015; 
Thomas, McGarty, Reese, Berndsen & Bliuc, 2016). 
Where did this global solidarity movement come from? Figure 1 shows that we 
propose that exposure to the image of Aylan Kurdi and the plight of Syrian refugees acted as 
a signal life experience which, alongside individual differences in legitimizing ideology, 
promoted solidarity with refugees through the formation of group consciousness.  
Antecedents to group formation. What are the individual differences most likely to 
be implicated in longstanding support for (or opposition to) refugees? Here we focus on 
individual differences in legitimizing ideologies such as right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; 
Altemeyer, 1988) or social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth & 
Malle, 1994) (see Figure 1, path a). We expect that higher levels of RWA and SDO will work 
against a pro-refugee group consciousness (see Stewart et al., 2015). People high in SDO are 
unlikely to take action because they seek to protect their privileged status; while people high 
in RWA are unlikely to take action because asylum seekers are perceived to represent a threat 
to the social order (e.g., Cameron & Nickerson, 2009; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Reese, Proch, 
& Cohrs, 2014). While SDO and RWA are often highly correlated, the Dual-Process 
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Motivational Model (DPM; Duckitt, 2001) suggests that these are unique, differential 
predictors of prejudice against lower status or minority groups.  
In relation to life experiences, Duncan (2012) articulated a role for broad experiences 
relating to family background, education and personal experiences. However, watershed 
moments can also provide the impetus for rapid mobilization (Duncan & Stewart, 2007; 
Minkoff, 1997). To the extent that iconic events can now be disseminated rapidly through 
global and social media, these foster what we term signal life experiences. Social media 
events can affect people in similar ways to other forms of direct experience and set in train 
similar processes to those enacted in off-line settings (e.g., Kende, van Zomeren, Ujhelyi & 
Lantos, 2016; Thomas et al., 2015). A key difference is that these processes can happen more 
swiftly and be shared more broadly than was previously possible (Castells, 2012). Social 
media provide spaces through which people can communicate a sense of grievance about the 
current status quo, and generate new identities (based on their opinions about how the world 
should be) through such social interaction (Smith, Thomas, & McGarty, 2015). The widely 
disseminated image of Aylan Kurdi created a widespread sense of injustice and grievance. 
The watershed of pro-refugee opinion that ensued in the online discussion provided social 
validation of views (Turner, 1991) and became a vehicle for group formation (Kende et al., 
2016; McGarty et al., 2014; Figure 1 path b).  
In sum, key individual differences about what is right and just in the world (path a; 
SDO and RWA) and signal life experiences (path b; exposure to iconic images of the refugee 
crisis through social media) are expected to predict psychological group formation. Duncan 
(2012) broadly conceives of the individual differences and life experiences variables as 
independent predictors of group formation (as in Figure 1). However, it is also possible that 
the two interact to explain those who identify as a supporters (and develop a group 
consciousness), versus those who do not.  Here, several outcomes are possible based on the 
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literature. One possibility is that, for people who had entrenched worldviews that opposed the 
movement of people (high SDO and RWA), exposure to the issue through social media 
crystallized their non-support (a “polarizing” effect). Such a pattern would help to explain the 
widespread political polarization that the image provoked (Reese, Rosenmann & McGarty, 
2015). On the other hand, there is evidence that the image of Aylan Kurdi effectively 
mobilized large swathes of the population who had not previously been active on this issue 
(Smith, McGarty & Thomas, in press). It is therefore possible that the image effectively 
“converted” those traditionally hostile to refugees, in a similar way that intergroup contact 
can have especially strong prejudice reduction effects on those high in RWA (but not SDO; 
Asbrock, Christ, Duckitt & Sibley, 2012). In order to conduct a comprehensive test of the 
antecedents of group formation, we tested whether legitimizing ideologies and exposure to 
the image of Aylan Kurdi directly and interactively predict those who came to identify as 
supporters of refugees (versus those who did not), and a pro-refugee group consciousness.  
An emergent group consciousness. Although personality and life experiences may 
predispose a person towards taking action (or not), current theorizing within social 
psychology suggests that people will be more likely to become part of a social movement 
when they see themselves as united with others who share the same goal (Klandermans, 
1997). Indeed, current approaches to collective action within social psychology emphasize 
that supporters must share a collective orientation to righting wrongs, and believe that they 
have the resources to act effectively (van Zomeren et al., 2008). Duncan (2012, p.781; 
Duncan, 1999) terms this constellation of factors group consciousness, encompassing “social 
psychological variables related to group identification and common fate, critical analysis of a 
group’s position in society, and a collective orientation toward redressing power imbalances 
between groups” (see also Bliuc et al., 2015; Fattori et al., 2015; Thomas et al., 2016). Figure 
1 shows that group consciousness is conceptualized as a combination of social identification, 
EXPLAINING TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 8 
moral emotions that capture a critical analysis of the group’s position (guilt, sympathy and 
outrage) and group efficacy beliefs that reflect the group’s beliefs about acting to address 
power imbalances (Duncan, 2012). 
What is the nature of the social identity that underpins the emergent movement? We 
propose that it is useful to consider social movements as groups based on shared opinions 
(opinion-based groups; Bliuc, McGarty, Reynolds, & Muntele, 2007). The opinion-based 
group concept is especially helpful where most supporters do not already belong to activist 
organizations or institutions; in circumstances where supporters are not acting in the interests 
of a social category that they belong to; and in cases where the longstanding experience of 
own-group adversity are not met (see Simon & Klandermans, 2001; also McGarty, Bliuc, 
Thomas, & Bongiorno, 2009). These are the circumstances that allow supporters to ‘become 
the change they want to see in the world’ (Smith, Thomas, & McGarty, 2015).1 
People must also believe that their group’s actions can be effective in order to 
undertake coordinated action (van Zomeren et al., 2008) and beliefs about the ability of the 
group to respond effectively is a key component of group consciousness (Duncan, 2012). 
Whereas problem-focused coping (group efficacy) focuses attention on the instrumental 
strategies that are likely to improve the situation, emotion-focused coping regulates the group 
emotions tied to perceptions of injustice (van Zomeren et al., 2004). Collective action 
research has typically focused on feelings of anger (e.g. Leach et al., 2006; Mackie et al., 
2000) or moral outrage (Thomas & McGarty, 2009) as drivers of action, although other 
emotions are likely to be implicated in the regulation of disadvantage (van Zomeren et al., 
2004) and can capture a critical analysis of the group’s position (Duncan, 2012). We 
therefore consider the role of three moral emotions as reactions to the injustice experienced 
by Syrian refugees: guilt, sympathy and moral outrage (Montada & Schneider, 1989).  
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Group-based guilt is an ingroup-focused emotion that arises from the appraisal of 
harm at least partly caused by the group’s actions (Leach et al., 2002), promoting behaviors 
that repair the wrongdoing rather than more wide-ranging forms of social justice action (Iyer 
et al., 2004; see Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009b, for a review). Sympathy, on the other-
hand, is outgroup-focused in that it focusses attention on the plight of the disadvantaged 
(Leach et al., 2002). Unlike guilt, sympathy does not attribute responsibility to any specific 
group or agent (Thomas et al., 2009b). Saab et al. (2015; also Thomas & McGarty, 2018) 
found that sympathy was a predictor of the tendency to support members of a disadvantaged 
group. Finally, moral outrage is also other-focused but instead of focusing attention on the 
suffering of the disadvantaged, it directs attention against a third party or authority held 
responsible for the disadvantage (Leach et al., 2002; Thomas et al., 2009b).  
The group consciousness concept therefore effectively captures (opinion-based) social 
identification, group efficacy and moral emotions (sympathy, guilt, outrage) as indicators of a 
latent factor (Figure 1). The relationships between these variables are known to be bi-
directional (see Thomas et al., 2012; Thomas, McGarty & Mavor, 2009a for a review) and 
synthesizing the variables in this way allows us to test more complex models than would be 
otherwise possible. We expect that group consciousness will be the proximal predictor of 
psychological and behavioral solidarity with refugees (path c, Figure 1).  
Social Mobilization Within and Across Nations 
The solidarity movement to support refugees in late 2015 was a global, transnational 
one, affecting social and political changes in the UK, Canada, the US, Australia, Eastern 
Europe, Western Europe, and beyond. The tensions between local and universal meanings are 
issues that have been widely considered in cross-cultural research on personality, however, 
they have not been systematically addressed in collective action research (see Stewart et al., 
2015 for an exception). This omission is important because culture (shared systems of 
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meaning) fundamentally affect the emergence, and manifestation of, collective action (van 
Zomeren & Louis, 2017; captured in paths e, f, and g respectively, Figure 1). Is the 
mobilization process anticipated in Figure 1 universal, or were there local (nation-specific) 
differences? Answering this question raises difficult theoretical and empirical questions (van 
Zomeren & Louis, 2017).  
Theoretically, one advantage of employing Duncan’s integrated model is that Duncan 
(2012, p.784) emphasizes the phenomenological aspects of collective action. The group 
consciousness variable therefore empirically captures the key drivers of collective action (at 
the group level; i.e., van Zomeren et al., 2008), alongside a theoretical emphasis on the lived 
experience of group membership too (see Drury, Cocking, Beale, Hanson, & Rapley, 2005). 
We would expect the phenomenological experience of the group to vary not least because of 
the diverging (social, political geo-political) circumstances of different nations reacting to the 
same events (path d, Figure 1). Emotions, in particular, capture the lived experience of 
politics in people’s lives (Leach, 2010). They are markers of the legitimacy and stability of 
intergroup relations (see Leach et al., 2002) so it follows that emotions will vary where 
aspects of the intergroup context vary (see Mackie, Smith & Ray, 2008, for a review). As 
such, the feelings of guilt, sympathy and outrage may act as markers of qualitative 
differences in group consciousness across nation.  
Similarly, it may be that some of the structural paths identified in Figure 1 play a 
relatively stronger or weaker role in some countries than others, speaking to important cross-
cultural variations in the overall mobilization process. There has been shown to be cross-
cultural variation in the relations between RWA, SDO and political attitudes respectively 
(Duriez, Van Hiel & Kossowksa, 2005, Figure 1, path f); as well as in the relationship 
between social media use and the organization of social movements (Harlow & Harp, 2011; 
Figure 1, path e). Fischer, Becker, Kito and Zayir (2017) observed that cultural structures 
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relating to self-construal (interdependent versus independent; Markus & Kitayama, 1991) and 
face concern, shape the form of collective action taken against sexism across different nations 
(path g).  
Empirically, questions about differences in phenomenology and subjective meaning 
are typically addressed through qualitative forms of analysis (e.g., Drury et al., 2005). We 
take a different approach and tackle these questions of cross-cultural similarity and difference 
using tests of measurement invariance (Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998). It is recognized 
that a given construct is stable across culture, and mean-level comparisons (e.g., of group 
consciousness) should only be made, where the loadings on that latent factor are the same 
across samples (metric invariant) and the intercepts are the same (scalar invariant; Dimitrov, 
2010). By contrast, significant differences in the loadings of a latent factor suggest qualitative 
differences in the meaning attributed to that construct (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). 
Although establishing measurement invariance is usually viewed as pre-condition for cross-
cultural or longitudinal comparisons, we suggest that it might be useful in its own right to 
map out similarities and differences in the content of a group consciousness latent factor. 
However, one tension here is that partial metric invariance is a pre-condition for multi-group 
structural equation models (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). That is, a basic level of (configural 
and partial metric) invariance must hold in order for cross-national comparisons in model 
paths to be meaningful (see Davidov et al., 2012). The implication is that our statistical 
methods can accommodate some cross-cultural difference but not absolute differences.  
The Current Research 
In September-October 2015, we sampled six countries that varied in their proximity to 
the movement of refugees and political responses to the refugee crisis: Hungary, Romania, 
Germany, the UK, the US and Australia. Participants were recruited in the aftermath of the 
response to the picture of Aylan Kurdi, but prior to the November 13 Paris terrorist attacks. In 
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line with our conceptualization of solidarity as both psychological and behavioural (Figure 
1), we adapted a pictorial measure of self-other overlap (Schubert & Otten, 2002) as a 
measure of the degree to which members of relatively advantaged groups (i.e., nations) 
experience psychological solidarity with refugees. We also took measures of the degree to 
which participants had already engaged in behaviors that reflect efforts to improve the 
circumstances of refugees, the degree to which they intended to in the future, and a measure 
of observed behavioral support for refugees. We test two sets of hypotheses based on Figure 
1. Our research is exploratory in that, in most instances, we do not specify formal a priori 
hypotheses about the specific pattern of differences across the six samples. Rather, our focus 
here is on demonstrating the utility of this framework for theorizing and empirically testing 
cross-cultural differences in the formation and outcomes of social movements.  
The first set of hypotheses relate to the antecedents to group formation. Key 
individual differences about what is right and just in the world (legitimizing ideologies; SDO 
and RWA, path a) and signal life experiences (exposure to iconic images of the refugee crisis 
through social media, path b) were expected to predict pro-refugee group consciousness. This 
emergent, pro-refugee group consciousness is then the proximal predictor of solidarity (see 
Figure 1, path c).  
We tested the antecedents of group formation in two ways. The first was to look at the 
role of legitimizing ideologies and signal life experiences, and their product (interaction 
term), in differentiating those identify as supporters of refugees (versus those who did not), 
controlling for culture. Our analysis tests the competing possibilities regarding the direct and 
interactive roles of legitimizing ideology and exposure to the iconic image: specifically, 
whether ideology and exposure do indeed combine to polarize people based along pre-
existing positions, or convert those especially hostile to outgroups. In a second substantive 
test of the antecedents of group formation, we modelled legitimizing ideologies and exposure 
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to the iconic image as predictors of a latent group consciousness factor using a sub-sample of 
self-identified supporters. Doing so allowed us to test whether the antecedents to group 
formation were the same across national context, or whether there was cross-cultural 
variation in that process (paths e and f). We did not make specific a priori predictions about 
whether those paths would be the same or different across the six samples. However, one 
possibility is that the dissemination of the image through social media played a less important 
role in Hungary where refugees entered as a point of transition and were therefore highly 
visible in the offline environment (c.f. Harlow & Harp, 2011).  
Our second set of hypotheses related to the cross-cultural conceptualization of group 
consciousness and its relation with solidarity. We expected that the same key components of 
group consciousness (identification, group efficacy, moral emotions of sympathy, guilt and 
outrage) would load significantly across nations (demonstrating configural invariance). 
Moreover, in keeping with the tenets of the social identity approach (Turner, 1991), we 
predicted that social identification would also be stable (metric invariant) across context, 
reflecting its central role in motivating collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2008). Thus, the 
subjective unity and common fate of the movement across great national diversity stems from 
shared (invariant, universal) group membership as supporters of refugees. 
However, in keeping with the ideas articulated above about moral group emotions as 
markers of intergroup relations, we expect that they (guilt, sympathy, and outrage) and group 
efficacy would be variant, yielding differences in the meaning of group consciousness (metric 
non-invariant). There were also expected to be mean level differences (scalar non-invariant) 
in emotions and efficacy across national samples. Thus, we did not expect to observe full 
measurement invariance because the measures are themselves sensitive to prevailing social, 
historical and (geo)political realities. It may be that, for instance, group consciousness is 
flavored more strongly by feelings of guilt in countries which had previously held retributive 
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political stances towards refugees (e.g., Australia, Romania, Hungary, and the UK) than in 
other samples, capturing illegitimate harm for which one’s own group is (at least partially) 
responsible (Thomas et al., 2009b). The need for pragmatism may also be stronger or weaker 
depending on the national context (e.g., how responsive the political authorities are), and this 
would be reflected in differences in the loading of efficacy across nations. In this way, we 
theoretically and empirically account for both a sense of unity across the national borders 
(generated by a universal or invariant social identification indicator) but also map out 
potential differences captured by diverging strength of the moral emotions and/or efficacy. 
Having identified which of the aspects of the group consciousness construct were the 
same/different across national contexts, we then test the full model anticipated in Figure 1 
using multi-group structural equation models. Cross-national differences in the manifestation 
of solidarity are reflected in stronger/weaker paths from group consciousness to solidarity on 
some markers compared to others (path g). Conversely, it was plausible that the model would 
be generalizable across samples indicating that group consciousness predicted different forms 
of solidarity relatively universally.  
Method 
Participants 
 Data were collected in September-October 2015.2 Participants were 1,367 people 
from six countries: Hungary (N =267), Romania (N = 163), Germany (N = 190), the United 
Kingdom (N = 159), the United States (N= 244) and Australia (N =344). We excluded 
participants who had missing responses for over 50% of the questions (n = 136; primarily 
people who had clicked on the link but not commenced the survey) or who completed the 
survey in less than four minutes (n = 4) – the sample sizes reported above are the final 
samples. These samples provide sufficient power to detect small effects (.10), with power = 
.80 and α = .05, in models with one latent variable and eleven observed variables (Soper, 
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2016). Participants were primarily female (59.47%; 30 people did not report their gender) and 
the average age was 30.77 (SD =15.2). Table 1 displays the demographic information for 
each of the samples.  
Procedure and Measures 
The questionnaire was originally constructed in English and the key items were 
altered to reflect the relevant country. For the German, Hungarian and Romanian samples the 
survey was backtranslated by at least two independent translators; disputes were resolved 
through discussion. In Australia, the US, Romania, and Hungary, data were collected online, 
while in Germany the data were collected through pencil and paper questionnaires; the UK 
participants chose to participate either online or via hard copy. In Australia, Romania, the US, 
and Germany, the sample comprised both members of the general public and students; the 
Hungarian and UK sample included only students who participated for course credit 
(Hungary) or as part of routine class activity (UK; see Table 1). In Australia, Romania, and 
the US, members of the general population were accessed by circulating a link to the 
questionnaire (titled “Attitudes about the Syrian refugee crisis”) through personal networks 
and/or posting on the webpages of public forums (e.g., Craigslist). In Germany, participants 
were approached on campus and in public places of a university town such as the train station 
and asked if they wished to participate. Particpants responded on a 7-point Likert type scale 
(1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree) unless otherwise indicated below. Please contact 
the lead author for copies of the questionanire (and translations) and/or raw anonymized data.  
Measures of individual differences and (signal) life experience 
Image and (social) media exposure. We considered the role of (social) media in two 
ways. To avoid experimental demands that could arise from referring directly to the image of 
Aylan Kurdi, we asked participants whether they had “seen a recent image (photo) of the 
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refugee crisis that has powerfully affected your views about this issue”; participants 
responded yes (=2) or no (=1).  
Second, to assess exposure to the issue through (social) media more generally we 
asked two questions to assess both the breadth and depth of exposure. To assess breadth (in 
terms of the range of media) we asked: “What is the main way that you have learned about 
the recent events of the Syrian refugee crisis?” Participants selected all that applied from 
television, newspaper, social media, radio, talking to other people, and other media. 
Participants were allocated a point for each media selected, summed such that the more 
media selected, the greater the breadth of exposure (values ranged from 0-6). To assess depth 
of exposure we also asked about the time spent engaging with this issue on social media: how 
much time they had spent in the past week reading online discussions or watching videos 
about the refugee crisis (None = code 1, 0-15 minutes = 2, 15-30 minutes = 3, 30 minutes-
1hour = 4, 1-3 hours = 5, 3+ hours = 6). We aggregated responses to these two questions to 
form a second measure of global and social media exposure.  
Legitimizing ideology. We used a single item from the social dominance orientation 
scale (SDO; Pratto et al., 1994) and a single item from the right wing authoritarianism scale 
(RWA; Altemeyer, 1998). The items were: “It’s OK if some groups have more of a chance in 
life than others” (SDO) and “The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to 
get back to our traditional values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the 
troublemakers spreading bad ideas”. The items were moderately correlated, r= .32, p < .001. 
Since they reflect different motivational states (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010), we retained them as 
separate predictors in our tests of the model.  
Measures of group consciousness 
Emotions: guilt, sympathy and outrage. Two items measured the emotions of guilt, 
sympathy and outrage, respectively. Participants read “Considering the plight of Syrian 
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refugees, I feel: Sympathetic [compassionate]; guilty [responsible]; outraged [angry]. The 
internal validity for all three scales was acceptable in each of the samples (α = .78-.95 
sympathy; α = .60-.89 guilt; α = .84-.92 outrage).  
Group efficacy. Two items measured group efficacy: “Together [national group 
members] can make a positive difference for Syrian refugees” and “Together [national group 
members] can improve the outcomes for Syrian refugees”, α = .88-.98 for each of the 
samples. 
Social identification. Participants were first asked to respond to a categorical item 
that assessed self-categorization as a supporter of Syrian refugees. “Please think about how 
you see yourself in relation to Syrian refugees. Do you identify as a supporter of global action 
to support Syrian refugees?” Participants responded ‘yes’ or ‘no’.  Participants who indicated 
that they did not identify as a supporter did not complete further measures of pro-refugee 
social identification. However, if they selected ‘yes’ to the categorical question,  participants 
were then asked to complete further measures of the degree of identification. Three items 
(adapted from Cameron, 2004) measured identification as a supporter of Syrian refugees 
(only for supporters): “I see myself as a supporter of Syrian refugees”; “I identify with other 
supporters of Syrian refugees”; “Supporters of Syrian refugees have a lot to be proud of”, α 
=.68-.82 for each of the samples.  
Measures of psychological and behavioral solidarity 
Psychological solidarity. Participants were presented with seven pictures of two 
increasingly overlapping circles; one circle was labeled [nation] and the other was labeled 
Syrian refugees (Schubert & Otten, 2002). Participants read the information that “The circles 
represent different levels of closeness between the two groups” and were asked to select the 
picture that best represents how close they, as a member of their national group, feel to Syrian 
refugees.  
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Behavioral solidarity: Past, future and observed behavior. We measured behavioral 
solidarity as past (self-reported) action, future action (action intention) and observed action. 
Participants responded to four items: “I intend to sign a petition” [and self-report: “I have 
already … etc”]; “I intend to support the plight of Syrian refugees by donating money to the 
cause”; “I intend to post on social media about this issue”; “I intend to volunteer to support 
refugees”. on 1-7 Likert-type scale indicating their agreement with the intention items, and 
indicated yes (=2) or no (=1) for the self-report items.3 Scales were internally consistent for 
future intended action, α =.62-.84, for past self-reported action in Australia and the US, both 
α = .62. However, past self-reported actions were not internally consistent in the other 
samples (α = .21-.47), probably because dichotomous data reduce variability (inter-item 
correlations). Past self-reported action was significantly correlated with both the intended 
behavior (r = .59, p < .001) and observed behavior (see below; r = .15, p < .001), providing 
convergent validity for the scales. Since people with higher scores report performing more of 
the relevant behaviors, we therefore created the scales as an index of past commitment.   
These measures of past and future action were supplemented with a measure of 
observed behavior. Specifically, participants were told that the researchers would make a 
donation of US$1 on their behalf. They were then asked to allocate how much of that US$1 
they would like to be sent to an accredited agency working to assist Syrian refugees, with any 
remainder to be allocated to an agency working to assist disadvantaged children within [the 
home nation]. This donation allocation thus constitutes a measure of observed behavioral 
support for refugees relative to another worthy cause. Researchers made these payments on 
behalf of participants.4  
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Results 
Analytical Strategy 
Our analysis comprised three parts. First, we used the entire sample to focus on 
distinguishing people who saw themselves as supporters of action on refugees versus those 
who did not. We expected that key individual differences (legitimizing ideology, path a) and 
media exposure (both to the specific image and overall, path b) would predict psychological 
group formation both uniquely and, prospectively, in interaction. Therefore, we conducted 
logistic regression analyses (controlling for non-independence) using SDO, RWA, and media 
exposure as independent variables to predict whether or not participants self-categorized as a 
supporter of Syrian refugees (see Figure 1).  
In the second and third sections, we included only people who identified as supporters 
to test the full integrative model of solidarity across the six nations (n = 955). This is because 
people who did not self-categorize as a supporter of refugees did not complete measures 
assessing the degree of their social identification. The second section tests for the 
measurement equivalence of group consciousness across nations using tests of measurement 
invariance following procedures outlined by Vandenberg and Lance (2000; measurement 
model, path d). In the third section, we used a multi-group structural equation model to test 
the full integrative model (paths a, b, c), and for national differences in the structural paths 
(structural model, paths e, f, and g).  
In both sections 2 and 3 the multi-group analyses employed a similar strategy. We 
adopted the preferred forward-testing method (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000), first estimating a 
baseline model in which all paths, intercepts and latent means were allowed to vary freely, 
and subsequently testing increasingly constrained models to see if fit significantly improved 
or deteriorated using tests of the chi-square difference. Invariance in measurement across 
countries is indicated if the more constrained model/s fit better than when indicators vary 
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freely across country (section 2, path d). Similarly, evidence that there are different relative 
weightings of the paths in the model (paths e, f, g) is suggested if the constrained model fit is 
better than the model where the paths are allowed to vary (section 3). Evidence of good fit is 
indicated by a non-significant chi-square, a CFI ≥ .95, a RMSEA ≤.08, and a SRMR ≤ .08.  
Preliminary Analyses 
Missing values analysis revealed a small amount of data (less than 5% for each 
variable in all the samples) that were missing completely at random (MCAR; all ps .11-.63) 
except in the German sample, which was not MCAR, χ2 (804) =1001.89, p <.001. Since there 
was negligible missing data from the German sample (<5%; see Enders, 2010) we 
nevertheless treated all values using Full Information Maximization Likelihood in MPlus 
version 7.2. Table 1 displays the means (standard deviations) for the key variables across the 
six samples. 
The Antecedents of Psychological Group Formation  
We first conducted multi-level binomial logistic regression exploring the antecedents 
of psychological group formation to test whether these predicted self-categorization as a 
supporter (versus not). For completeness, we also tested for interactions between ideology 
(SDO/RWA) and media exposure (image/overall) using the procedures identified by Aiken 
and West (1991). Independent variables were centered and interaction terms were created 
based on their multiplication. Since the data were nested at the nation-level, we controlled for 
non-independence of observations using the ‘complex’ command in MPlus; doing so allows 
us to take into account the non-independence of observations using a sandwich estimator but 
it does not specify a model for the between- nation level (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2007).  
In the first step, social media (image and overall exposure) and ideology (SDO and 
RWA) terms were entered as predictors of the dependent variable, self-categorization (coded 
no = 1, 2 = yes). In the second step, we entered the four interaction terms between ideology 
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(RWA and SDO) and the two media variables. We found support for the idea that 
legitimizing ideology was a significant negative predictor of membership, γ =-.26, s.e. = .06, 
p < .001 for SDO, γ = -.25, s.e = .03, p< .001 for RWA (path a). Exposure to iconic images 
marginally predicted self-categorization as a supporter, γ = .13, s.e. = .07, p = .057, but 
overall media exposure did not, γ = -.07, s.e. = .09, p = .42 (path b). However, as expected, 
there was a significant two-way interaction between SDO and media exposure, γ = -.09, s.e. = 
.03, p = .009; there were no other significant interactions (all ps > .14). Figure 2 displays the 
interaction. It shows that overall media exposure did not affect the likelihood of being a 
supporter for those low in social dominance orientation, unstandardized γ = .06, s.e. = .14, p = 
.64. For those high in social dominance orientation, however, higher social media exposure 
was associated with a reduced likelihood of identifying as a supporter, unstandardized γ = -
.18, s.e. = .08, p = .02.  
Thus, ideologies that legitimize inequality (RWA and SDO) both directly and, in 
combination with exposure to the issue through social media, significantly reduced the 
likelihood that participants self-categorized as a supporter of Syrian refugees (paths a, b).  We 
note that the image predictor was a marginal predictor but may have been weak because it is 
categorical (yielding a categorical IV predicting a categorical DV) and had truncated range; 
Table 1 shows that, for all the samples except Germany, the majority of people reported 
having seen powerful images of the crisis.  
Group Consciousness Across Nations: A Test of Measurement Invariance 
Our initial test of measurement invariance (path d) specified a latent factor model 
with five indicators: identification, group efficacy, and the three emotions (guilt, sympathy 
and outrage). We first estimated the model separately for each of the six samples. Fit was 
poor for several of the samples and the combined (baseline) chi-square was large and 
significant, χ2 (30) = 84.276, p<.001. Outrage was a non-significant predictor in the 
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Hungarian and Romanian samples and a weak predictor in the UK sample. Since a similar 
pattern of zero and non-zero loadings across samples (i.e., configural invariance) must be met 
in order to conduct subsequent tests of measurement invariance and multi-group models 
(Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998), we removed outrage and focused our test of the 
emotional predictors of sympathy and guilt. Accordingly, our (revised) initial test specified a 
latent model with four indicators: identification, sympathy, guilt and efficacy. The results of 
the tests for each step of measurement equivalence are displayed in Table 2. The details of all 
the specific models that were tested (i.e., whether each of the indicators was different within 
each level of measurement invariance) can be found in the supplementary materials. 
We first tested the model with unconstrained factor loadings and intercepts. Fit was 
acceptable to excellent for all the samples, χ2 (2) = .82 – 7.05, and the combined (baseline) 
chi-square was moderate and only marginally significant, demonstrating configural 
invariance (Model 1, Table 2). Thus, the model is valid for each of the national samples. 
In order to test whether the weightings of indicators were the same or significantly 
different (metric invariant), we next compared this model with one in which the parameters 
for the indicators were constrained to be the same across the six samples (path d). In order for 
the model to be identified, we had to set one path to unity: we selected identification because 
it had the most similar unstandardized regression weights across nations (see Dimitrov, 
2010). Overall model fit deteriorated (Model 2a, Table 2). The difference between Model 1 
and 2a was significant, ∆χ2 (15) = 27.32, p =.03, confirming that the meaning of the latent 
variable was different for the different samples (metric non-invariance). The best fitting 
model (see Model 2b, Table 2) held sympathy and identification invariant across samples, 
with guilt and efficacy allowed to differ across samples (see supplementary analysis for 
details). Thus, the factor loadings are identical (invariant) for sympathy and identification 
across the national samples, but differ substantively across nations for guilt and efficacy. This 
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suggests that the meaning of the latent construct (group consciousness) is different across 
national contexts because it is indicated more strongly by guilt/efficacy in some places than 
others. 
We next sought to establish whether the intercepts were the same across samples 
(scalar invariance). To do so we compared the best-fitting metric invariance model (Model 
2b) with a model in which the intercepts were constrained to be the same. Overall model fit 
deteriorated dramatically (see Model 3, Table 2), and the difference between Model 2a and 3 
was significant, ∆χ2 (20) = 437.33, p <.001, indicating that the levels of the items are 
different across the samples (scalar non-invariant). That is, the mean levels of the underlying 
items (guilt, efficacy, identification, sympathy) varied significantly across samples. The best 
fitting scalar invariant model allowed all four items to be different (see supplementary file) 
and was thus identical to Model 2b.   
The final measurement model incorporated partial measurement invariance (for the 
factor loadings of sympathy and identification) but allowed the other factor loadings, 
intercepts and residual variances to vary freely (path d). Substantively, the model captures 
that identification and sympathy were stable across national context, but that guilt and 
efficacy flavored the group consciousness more strongly in some nations than others (see 
Figure 3); there was variation in the levels of each of the items across nation. This partial 
measurement invariance allows for tests of the structural model but precludes cross-cultural 
comparisons of mean levels of the latent variable group consciousness (Dimitrov, 2010).  
Testing the Integrative Model across Nations: Multi-group Analyses 
Having identified a suitable measurement model for the group consciousness factor, 
we adopted a similar approach in our tests of the full structural model. We first tested a 
baseline model in which all the structural paths were freely estimated. RWA, SDO, exposure 
to the image, and social media exposure predicted the group consciousness latent factor (that 
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was indicated by identification, guilt, sympathy and efficacy). Group consciousness predicted 
psychological solidarity, as well as past, future and observed solidarity action 5. Fit was 
acceptable, χ2 (258) = 424.40, p < .001, RMSEA = .07, CFI = .93. SRMR = .06, though the 
CFI indicated that there was scope for improvement. Inspection of the standardized pathways 
showed that RWA was not a unique predictor of group consciousness in any of the samples 
except for Hungary (β = -.25, p = .01). Given that it played a muted independent role in these 
data, we removed RWA from our test of the integrative model.  
Our test of the model (without RWA) again demonstrated acceptable fit, χ2 (216) = 
360.67, p < .001, RMSEA = .07 [90% CI .05, .08], CFI = .94, SRMR = .06. The chi-square 
statistic and indices based on its distribution (the CFI) are sensitive to large sample sizes, and 
the other indices suggested good fit (the RMSEA and the SRMR; Kline, 1998). This therefore 
became our baseline model. Figure 4 shows the pattern of standardized regression weights 
when they are not constrained to be the same for the six samples. Figure 4 shows that 
exposure to the iconic image and social media are weak positive predictors of group 
consciousness (path b), whilst SDO was a weak-moderate negative predictor (path a). Group 
consciousness was strongly indicated by social identification, guilt and sympathy, and more 
weakly indicated by group efficacy. Group consciousness, in turn, was a moderate to strong 
predictor of psychological solidarity, past, observed and future solidarity action (path c).  
Having established that the model fit with the different samples, we next compared 
this baseline model with one in which the paths were constrained to be the same across the 
six samples as a test of cross-cultural difference (paths e, f, and g). Overall model fit 
deteriorated, χ2 (251) = 414.48, p< .001, RMSEA = .07, CFI = .93, SRMR = .10. The 
difference between the two models was significant, ∆χ2 (35) = 53.81, p = .02, confirming that 
there are differences in the relative weightings of the paths in the model across the different 
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national samples. That is, there is evidence of cross-national variability in the model 
(supporting paths e, f, g, Figure 1). 
 In order to determine the nature of those differences we systematically released each 
of the pathways to see if fit improved significantly compared to the baseline model. There 
was no evidence of cross-national variability for the paths from SDO to group consciousness 
(path f, p > .05) and overall media exposure to group consciousness (path e, p > .05), 
however fit improved significantly for the path from image to group consciousness, ∆χ2(30) = 
46.44, p = .03 (path e). This suggests that SDO and social media exposure were related to 
group consciousness in a relatively universal fashion but that there were national differences 
for the relationship between exposure to the image and group consciousness. 
In terms of the relationship between group consciousness and solidarity outcomes 
(path g), fit also improved when the paths from group consciousness to psychological 
solidarity, ∆χ2(30) = 48.16, p = .02, as well as past, ∆χ2(30) = 48.89, p = .02, future ∆χ2 (30) = 
48.05, p = .02, and observed behavior ∆χ2(30) = 52.66, p = .01 were released, indicating that 
there is variation in all of these paths across the samples. Our final tests constrained paths to 
be similar/different based on the weightings observed in Figure 4. Holding similarly weighted 
paths to equality (but allowing them to differ across countries) did not significantly improve 
fit above the models in which all the paths varied freely. Since including the additional 
constraints did not improve fit, we retained the more parsimonious model for each pathway 
(allowing them to vary freely), χ2 (226) = 389.48, p < .001, RMSEA .= 07 [90% CI .06, .08], 
CFI = .93, SRMR = .07. Overall, Figure 4 provides good support for the key hypothesized 
paths in the integrative model; it also illustrates that there was both cross-cultural variability 
and stability in the mobilization process.  
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Discussion 
When do social movements form in relation to iconic events? How do these processes 
transcend national, cultural and geographical boundaries to effect global social change? Our 
research considers behavioral and psychological solidarity with Syrian refugees as an 
outcome of individual differences in legitimizing ideology, exposure to iconic events through 
global and social media, and group processes (the formation of a group consciousness). 
Across six different national samples (with diverging geo-political obligations and responses 
to the crisis) obtained in the aftermath of the global reaction to the image of Aylan Kurdi, we 
showed that social movements form when exposure to iconic events through social media 
intersect with pre-existing world-views (especially social dominance orientation) to catalyze 
the formation of new groups (paths a, b, Figure 1). These new groups were defined along 
opinion-based fault lines: people who support, or do not support, action to assist Syrian 
refugees (Bliuc et al., 2007).  
We also sought to tackle one of the key challenges raised by these transnational 
phenomena: how can we understand those factors that promote a subjective sense of common 
cause, whilst at the same time acknowledging variation in those processes across national 
contexts? To that end, we adapted Duncan’s conceptualization of group consciousness as a 
latent factor indicated by social identification, moral group emotions, and group efficacy 
beliefs. We adopted methods routinely taken up in cultural psychology to show that the same 
pattern of indicators universally (significantly) captured group consciousness (configural 
invariance), and also that social identification and sympathy were two factors that were stable 
across the six samples considered here (they showed metric invariance). However, the 
importance of feelings of guilt and efficacy beliefs to the group consciousness factor varied 
systematically across the samples, producing a group consciousness that was different across 
nations (metric non-invariant). Thus, the meaning of the group consciousness was flavored 
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more strongly by guilt in Germany and the UK; and by relatively greater efficacy in the UK 
and Australia (path d, Figure 1).  
Finally, we also sought to consider whether the processes of mobilization were the 
same or different across national contexts (van Zomeren & Louis, 2017). Here we again 
found evidence of cross-cultural stability and variability in the importance of specific paths. 
Exposure to iconic images of the crisis through global and social media was more important 
in the formation of a group consciousness in Romania, the UK and the US, and relatively less 
important for participants in Australia, Germany and Hungary (path e, Figure 1). Figure 4 
shows that the strength of the relationship between media exposure and group consciousness, 
and SDO and group consciousness, respectively, varied from zero to moderate. However, the 
tests of the full model included only self-assigned supporters so the variability in the 
independent variables was likely to have been restricted relative to tests that included the full 
sample. Similarly, the strength of the relationship between group consciousness and solidarity 
outcomes (psychological and behavioral) was also different across national contexts (path g, 
Figure 1). Psychological solidarity was more strongly associated with group consciousness in 
Hungary; past self-reported action was more important in the US and Australian samples, 
whilst future intention was less central in the German and Hungarian samples (see Figure 4). 
Overall, we found strong support for our hypotheses about the ways in which individual 
differences, life experiences and group processes combine to explain how social movements 
form within and across nations. 
Why Now? Discontinuity in Social Movement Formation 
Livingstone (2014) considered whether social psychological models can tell us 
something about the point at which protest will emerge, ultimately concluding that existing 
models tell us little about the tipping points in collective action (see also McGarty et al., 
2014). The current research conceives of rapid social movement formation as a process of 
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novel group formation, arguing that in order to understand the generation of new phenomena 
we need to understand identities formed based on opinions about iconic issues or events 
(Bliuc et al., 2007; Thomas et al., 2015). Moreover, we need to understand what makes one 
person more likely to experience group formation, and how these individual differences are 
shaped by events in the social world (Duncan, 2012).  
In terms of differentiating those who identified as supporters (versus those who do 
not), being low in legitimizing ideologies (SDO and RWA) was associated with increased 
likelihood of self-categorizing as a supporter. People who hold entrenched worldviews that 
support hierarchies (SDO) or see the movement of people as a threat (RWA) are less likely to 
be a part of the mobilization potential (path a, Figure 1; Klandermans, 1997; Stewart et al., 
2015). Moreover, exposure to powerful images such as that of Aylan Kurdi, appears to 
undermine group formation for those high in social dominance orientation (Figure 2; cf. 
Asbrock et al., 2012). Thus, although social media plays an important role in predicting group 
consciousness amongst those who are self-identified supporters, it seems to polarize support 
and opposition on both sides of the debate.  
It has long been observed that specific iconic events (such as those initiated by Rosa 
Parks, the Greensboro Four or Mohamed Bouazizi) form signal moments, which catalyze 
social movements (Castells, 2012; Minkoff, 1997). Such events represent watershed moments 
in social movement formation, and social media provide ways to rapidly disseminate these 
events, providing spaces for people to validate their views across geographical, cultural and 
national boundaries (Smith, Thomas & McGarty, 2015). Contrary to accounts that emphasize 
the superficial nature of engagement online, the popular sympathy generated by the image of 
Aylan Kurdi provoked change in many countries, confirming the power of social media to 
shape social change at a global level (path b, Figure 1; Castells, 2012; Smith, McGarty & 
Thomas, in press; c.f. Morozov, 2011).  
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How Social Movements Mobilize Action Within and Across Nations 
Our theories and methods need to consider both the factors that promote unity across 
transnational diversity and also those factors that imbue group membership with a local 
(national) flavor. With the exception of outrage (which did not play a uniformly important 
role), we found that the hypothesized markers of group consciousness were valid for each of 
the national samples (configural invariance). Social identification – psychological 
membership of a group of people who support refugees – was also shown to be a universal 
(metric invariant) component of the emergent group consciousness supporting the core tenant 
of the social identity approach that social identification promotes perception of similarity and 
unity in the social movement (Turner, 1991). However, cognitive measures of social 
identification does not allow for a consideration of the ways in which the experience of group 
membership may differ, depending on culture, language, and history as well as current socio-
political realities. Whilst the social psychological literature on collective action scholarship 
recognizes the importance of social identification, it has engaged rather less with the 
phenomenology of group membership (Duncan, 2012; but see, e.g., Drury et al., 2005, also 
Thomas et al., 2009a). It was here that beliefs about the nations’ ability to act effectively (as a 
coordinated group), as well as emotions that indicate a critical analysis of the (national) 
group’s position (guilt) more meaningfully provide information about cross-cultural variation 
in the group consciousness in the different samples (path d, Figure 1).  
 The results suggested that feelings of guilt and efficacy beliefs played a relatively 
stronger/weaker role in explaining the group consciousness across national contexts. Whilst it 
is tempting to provide a post-hoc explanation for these differences in terms of the prevailing 
social, geo-political contexts, it is important to note that there can be many different reasons 
for measurement invariance (see Byrne & Watkins, 2003, for a review). Differences can 
reflect “real” (genuine) cross-cultural differences and/or be due to measurement error or 
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differences in methodology (sampling, question translation) and it is not straightforward to 
disentangle these effects (see Byrne & Watkins, 2003; van Zomeren & Louis, 2017). In this 
case, guilt loaded onto the group consciousness factor to a relatively greater degree in 
Germany and the UK, suggesting the possibility of different historical (Germany) and/or 
current political (UK) realities (Vis & Goriunova, 2015). Similarly, the importance of 
instrumental coping (efficacy beliefs; van Zomeren et al., 2004) was stronger or weaker, 
possibly reflecting the real barriers to action that confronted the supporter in that context. 
Future research should include sufficient numbers of Level 2 units (national groups) to use 
multi-level structural equation models to differentiate item bias from “genuine” cross-cultural 
difference (as suggested by Davidov et al., 2012). 
 We also considered whether the mobilization process outlined in Figure 1 was stable 
(universal) across the six countries, or whether there was cross-national variation. The results 
suggested that there was variation in the importance of the iconic image in explaining group 
consciousness (path e, Figure 1) but also that the form of the solidarity (path g, Figure 1) 
differed across context. However, individual differences played a stable role (path f, Figure 1) 
and the nature of social media exposure was also invariant (path e, Figure 1). Again, post-hoc 
explanations are not appropriate given that we cannot rule out differences in sample and 
methodological artefacts for these effects. It may be that the social media exposure was stable 
across cultures because the phenomena itself is not bounded by national borders.  
Nevertheless, we believe that this method of theoretically and empirically accounting 
for cross-cultural similarity and difference using tests of measurement and structural 
invariance holds great promise. Qualitative approaches can provide a rich perspective on the 
lived experience of group membership (e.g., Drury et al., 2005; Stuart, Thomas, Donaghue & 
Russell, 2013) but may also be fraught with difficulty in cross-cultural settings where many 
national samples are involved. We therefore believe that the method of using tests of 
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measurement invariance could form a useful addition to the social psychological toolkit.  This 
method could also be more widely adopted in social psychological research generally to 
model, for example, changes in identity content pre- and post- experimental intervention 
(e.g., group interaction; Thomas & McGarty, 2009), or qualitative changes in the meaning of 
group membership as a group politicizes or radicalizes (e.g., Thomas et al., 2014).  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 SDO and RWA were each measured with a single item and we do not know if 
findings would differ had we used the full scales. Given the muted findings for RWA in 
explaining group consciousness, it may also be the case that RWA is more strongly 
implicated in the emergence of anti-refugee group consciousness rather than undermining 
refugee support per se. It is also the case that, due to a lack of Level 2 units (i.e., national 
samples) we could not test a full multi-level structural equation model. Finally, our samples 
were not representative and therefore it was not appropriate to make inferences about sample 
intercepts (scalar invariance) and/or compare overall mean-level differences across samples.  
The research is strengthened by an integrative focus on how individual differences, 
exposure to iconic events as signal life experience, and group processes (group 
consciousness) intersect to predict solidarity with refugees. Beyond group processes per se 
(van Zomeren et al., 2008), this integrative focus is important because it provides a more 
complete picture of the kinds of people who engage in action for social change and how they 
are shaped by events in their social world. In terms of future research, political affiliation (see 
Bliuc et al., 2015), personal political salience (Duncan & Stewart, 2007), or values 
(Schwartz, 1992)  may also act as alternative (individual differences) resources for the 
building of a group consciousness (see Thomas et al., 2016). In terms of life experiences and 
other threshold events (and beyond those considered by Duncan, 2012) it is possible that 
positive intergroup contact with members of the disadvantaged or minority group may also 
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act to catalyze action (Pettigrew, 1998). Other identities, for example, dual identity as a 
national and global citizen (Reese, Berthold, & Steffens, 2016), or human-level identity 
(McFarland, Webb & Brown, 2012) may also be implicated in the group consciousness 
factor. Although we have applied this framework to understanding a pro-social response 
(global solidarity), we also expect that it could be readily adapted to explore the processes 
underscoring the emergence of hostile social movements (Thomas, Smith, McGarty & 
Postmes, 2010). 
Finally, the approach that we have adopted here might be termed a structural one in 
that we seek to identify a pattern of predictors of solidarity within and across diverging 
national contexts. However, many of the hypotheses speak to psychological transformation 
(group formation) and future research could examine the mechanisms or processes associated 
with change using dynamic methods that show experimentally how individual differences 
find force in group processes (see Thomas, McGarty & Mavor, 2016, p.146, for a discussion 
of ‘macro’ structural models and ‘micro’ transformational models in collective action 
research). Indeed, given that our focus here was on providing a theoretical and 
methodological framework for identifying universal and nation-specific differences in social 
mobilization, we did not make a priori predictions about the specific differences across 
nations. Future research may seek to fill this gap and incorporate insights relevant to cross-
cultural psychology into theorizing about collective action (e.g., Fischer et al., 2017).  
Concluding Comments 
 The current research has considered the ways that current social events and political 
realities become part of a group consciousness, to contribute to world-changing social 
movements. The events of the Arab Spring, Occupy, the emergence of ISIS, and the global 
solidarity witnessed in response to the image of Aylan Kurdi all attest to the point that world-
changing social movements can emerge from out of nowhere, to address wrongs that have 
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persisted for years or even decades prior. The recent history of the world has been about 
emerging, interconnected popular social movements. Social psychology is in a strong 
position to explain these events and in doing so contribute to a truly consequential 
psychological science.  
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Footnotes 
1 Opinion-based identities can be politicized identities, in the sense that they incorporate an 
awareness of the power relations in which a struggle is embedded (Simon & Klandermans, 
2001); however, in this case, the term ‘politicized identity’ does not sufficiently differentiate 
supporters of refugees from opponents of refugees, both of whom can both be acting in terms 
of a politicized identity but advocate fundamentally different visions of social relations. 
2Specifically, in Australia the data were collected between 16th September and 5th October; in 
the United Kingdom between the 1st and 8th October; in the United States between the 22nd 
September and 8th October; in Romania between the 15th October and 26th October; in 
Hungary on the 21st September; and Germany between the 29th September and 25th October.  
3 In the Romanian sample there was a data collection anomaly such that participants 
responded to the self-report items on a 7-point Likert type scale (Strongly Disagree-Strongly 
Agree), instead of on a binary (yes/no) scale as in the other samples. 
4 Payments were made as directed by participants to the International Red Cross, as well as 
the national division of Save the Children for all of the countries except for Hungary, for 
whom a donation was made to the Polgar Foundation for Equal Opportunities.  
5 For completeness, we also tested a model which included the interaction terms between 
image and SDO, RWA; and overall media exposure and SDO, RWA, as predictors of group 
consciousness in each of the samples. None of the interaction terms were significant except 
for that between overall media exposure and SDO in Romania (β =.58, p< .001). 
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Table 1. Demographic information and descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviations) for 
the key variables for the six samples.  
 Hungary 
 
N = 267 
Romania 
 
N = 163 
Germany 
 
N = 190 
United 
Kingdom 
N = 159 
United 
States 
N = 244 
Australia 
 
N = 344 
% Female  78.7 76.7 51.1 82.4 69.7 23.3 
Age  21.22 
(2.48) 
37.4 
(10.80) 
27.51 
(9.55) 
18.5  
(1.48) 
40.08 
(21.97) 
36.5 
(15.07) 
% Students  100 100 36.3 96.9 42.2 14.2 
% Supporters 37.5 44.2 81.1 90.6 82.4 82.6 
Social dominance 2.89 
(1.61) 
3.62 
(1.77) 
2.63 
(1.50) 
2.53 
(1.49) 
2.65 
(1.72) 
2.64 
(1.79) 
Right-wing 
authoritarianism 
3.26 
(1.75) 
3.70 
(1.93) 
2.81 
(1.62) 
2.32 
(1.34) 
2.65 
(1.81) 
2.88 
(2.09) 
% People who have 
seen image 
64.4 54.6 29.5 68.6 72.5 78.2 
Overall media 
exposure 
3.06   
(.76) 
2.21 
(0.92) 
2.89 
(1.06) 
2.01 
(0.76) 
2.29 
(0.93) 
3.09 
(0.97) 
Social identification 5.61 
(0.75) 
5.04 
(0.98) 
4.80 
(0.96) 
5.47 
(0.87) 
5.40 
(0.99) 
6.03 
(1.00) 
Group efficacy 3.42 
(1.38) 
3.82 
(1.68) 
4.85 
(1.50) 
5.86 
(1.09) 
5.44 
(1.30) 
5.71 
(1.66) 
Guilt 3.05 
(1.37) 
2.86 
(1.34) 
3.78 
(1.31) 
3.70 
(1.48) 
3.45 
(1.71) 
3.77 
(1.97) 
Sympathy 4.54 
(1.29) 
5.36 
(1.37) 
5.69 
(1.07) 
6.27 
(0.81) 
5.95 
(1.21) 
6.05 
(1.64) 
Outrage 3.38 
(1.56) 
3.80 
(1.67) 
4.21 
(1.69) 
5.17 
(1.32) 
5.17 
(1.61) 
5.45 
(1.77) 
Psychological (self-
other) solidarity  
2.61 
(1.35) 
2.54 
(1.45) 
3.36 
(1.33) 
2.94 
(1.50) 
3.06 
(1.70) 
3.61 
(2.07) 
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Past (self-reported) 
solidarity 
1.95 
(0.13) 
1.94 
(0.14) 
1.83 
(0.20) 
1.82 
(0.23) 
1.82 
(0.26) 
1.56 
(0.32) 
Future (intended) 
solidarity 
3.26 
(1.35) 
3.24 
(1.43) 
3.78 
(1.12) 
4.63 
(1.17) 
4.37 
(1.36) 
4.98 
(1.75) 
Observed solidarity 
(allocation) 
4.66 
(2.89) 
5.60 
(3.73)  
7.44 
(2.93) 
7.75 
(3.34) 
8.30 
(3.65) 
8.47 
(3.56) 
EXPLAINING TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 45 
45 
 
Table 2. Fit statistics for tests of measurement invariance for the group consciousness factor across the samples 
  Interpretation of the different steps of measurement 
invariance testing 
χ2 (df) p RMSEA  CFI SRMR 
Model 1 Configural 
invariance 
Same pattern of significant indicator to factor 
loadings across samples. The model is valid for 
each of the nations.  
χ2 (12) = 20.79, p = .05  .07 .99 .03 
Model 2a Metric invariance  Factor loadings are the same across samples. The 
respondents attribute the same meaning to the 
latent construct.  
χ2 (27) = 48.11, p = .007 .07 .97
  
.11 
Model 2b  Best fitting metric invariance model χ2 (18) = 26.64, p = .09 .06 .99 .05 
Model 3 Scalar invariance  The intercepts are the same across samples. The 
levels of the underlying items are equal across 
nations.  
χ2 (38) = 463.96, p < .001 .27 .44 .37 
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Figure 1. Conceptual adaptation of Duncan’s (2012) integrated model. Key individual differences relating to legitimizing worldviews (a;  
RWA and SDO) and exposure to iconic events through social media (b) precipitate an emergent group consciousness. Group consciousness (“we 
are”, “we believe” “we feel”) is, in turn, the proximal predictor of solidarity with members of disadvantaged groups (c). Culture (shared systems 
of meaning) qualifies the antecedents of group formation (a, b), the outcomes of group formation (g), as well as the nature of the group itself (d).  
g f 
e 
d 
c 
b 
a 
Antecedents to group formation: individual 
differences and life experiences 
        Psychological group 
formation: group processes 
   Social movement 
formation: outcomes    
Individual differences 
Legitimizing worldviews 
(right-wing 
authoritarianism and social 
dominance orientation) 
Psychological solidarity 
(“we” stand with refugees) 
and behavioral solidarity 
(past, future and observed 
action to support refugees) 
Group consciousness 
(social identification, group 
efficacy and moral group 
emotions) Life experiences 
Exposure to iconic events 
through global and social 
media 
Culture 
Shared systems 
of meaning 
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Figure 2.  Probability of classification as a supporter of Syrian refugee decreases for those who are high in social dominance orientation 
and who report high levels of media exposure.  
  
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Low social dominance
orientation
High social dominance
orientation
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
 o
f 
cl
a
ss
if
ic
a
ti
o
n
 a
s 
su
p
p
o
rt
er
Low
media
exposure
High
media
exposure
EXPLAINING TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 48 
48 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Loadings of the four indicators (social identification, guilt, sympathy and group efficacy) on the group consciousness factor for 
the six samples when allowed to vary freely. Model includes self-identified supporters only (n = 955).  
 
  
 RO      HU      GER    UK     US     AUS 
.878,    .777,    .618,   .738,   .818,    .861 
 RO     HU     GER     UK     US       AUS 
.520,   .477,    .683,    .623,   .411,     .532 
 RO     HU     GER     UK     US      AUS 
.419,   .627,    .546,    .630,   .802,    .714 
 RO     HU     GER     UK     US     AUS 
.317,   .269,   .462,     .647,   .447,  .686 
Group 
consciousness 
Group efficacy Social identification Guilt Sympathy 
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Figure 4.  Weightings of the measurement and structural paths for the integrative model for the six samples, for self-identified supporters 
only (n = 955). 
Observed solidarity 
(allocation)  
Image 
(1 = no, 2 = yes) 
Social media 
exposure 
Social dominance 
orientation 
Group 
consciousness 
Psychological 
solidarity 
(self-reported) Past 
solidarity action 
Future solidarity 
action (intention) 
Group efficacy Social identification Guilt Sympathy 
 RO   HU   GER  UK   US   AUS 
.516, .740, .657, .772, .758, .837 
Individual differences and life experiences Psychological group 
formation 
Social movement 
formation 
 RO   HU   GER  UK   US   AUS 
.633, .505, .730, .644, .503, .569 
 RO   HU   GER  UK   US   AUS 
.277, .633, .551, .592, .697, .743 
 RO   HU   GER  UK   US   AUS 
.362, .299, .314,  .554, .460, .687 
 RO    HU   GER    UK    US    AUS 
.241, -.016, .206, .154, .253, .096 
 RO   HU   GER  UK   US   AUS 
.388, .137, .190,  .352, .379, .133 
 RO   HU    GER    UK    US   AUS 
.003, -.373, -.365, -.295, -.134, -.387 
 RO   HU   GER   UK   US   AUS 
.537, .695,  .538,  .436, .421, .462 
 RO   HU   GER  UK   US   AUS 
.146, .417,  .360, .352, .418, .506 
 RO    HU    GER    UK    US    AUS 
 .407, .319,  .448,   .532, .467,   .433 
 RO   HU   GER   UK   US   AUS 
.835, .680, .676,  .798, .818,  .747 
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Supplementary Analyses 
Measurement Invariance 
Our reporting follows the recommendations of van de Schoot, Lugtig and Hox (2012) 
in that we report the results from each of the key steps of measurement invariance 
(configural, metric, scalar and residual; Table 2) as well as an overall description of the final 
model (where it was variant and invariant) in the primary results section. However, within 
each of these key steps we undertook further model testing to identify the specific pattern of 
variance/invariance across our six samples (partial measurement invariance). Below we 
provide more detail about the specific pattern of invariance testing that we carried out for 
each of the tests of measurement invariance.  
Metric invariance. Having established that our samples had different strengths of 
loadings to the group consciousness factor (by comparing Model 1 and 2a), our next tests 
sought to determine the specific pattern of those differences. Figure 3 shows the pattern of 
loadings for the indicators when they are freely estimated (i.e., not constrained to be similar). 
The loadings of social identification and sympathy were similar across samples but there was 
some variability in the loadings of guilt and efficacy. We therefore systematically released 
each of the parameters for the three indicators (identification was set to unity for model 
identification) to see if fit improved significantly compared to the baseline model. We found 
no improvements if sympathy was released, ∆χ2 (10) = 9.81, p = .46, but significant 
improvement for both guilt, ∆χ2 (10) = 21.88, p =.02 and efficacy, ∆χ2 (10) = 18.55, p = .05, 
confirming that guilt and efficacy play a different role across the six samples but that 
sympathy and identification had metric invariance (path d, Figure 1).  
Figure 3 indicates that guilt seemed to play a lesser role in Hungary and the US, and a 
stronger role in Germany and the UK, with Romania and Australia falling in between; and 
efficacy played a negligible role in Hungary and Romania, but a stronger role in the UK and 
EXPLAINING TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 51 
51 
 
Australia, with Germany and the US falling in between. Our final tests therefore set these 
pairs of nations to equality; that is, rather than constraining all of the weights to be different 
for each country, we constrained Germany and the UK to be the same for guilt, Hungary and 
Romania to be the same for efficacy and so on. Doing so significantly improved model fit 
compared to a model where all weights varied freely, ∆χ2 (7) = 20.98, p = .004 for efficacy, 
though this was marginal for guilt, ∆χ2 (7)= 13.47, p = .06. The model demonstrated excellent 
fit, χ2 (18) = 26.64, p = .09, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .05. This became the model 
against which subsequent tests of scalar and residual invariance were compared (Model 2b, 
Table 2).  
Scalar invariance. We adopted a similar logic for our tests of scalar invariance, in 
order to ascertain which items (measures) were scalar invariant/non-invariant. Table 1 shows 
that the mean levels of the items (efficacy, guilt, sympathy, identification) vary across 
countries but that there is more variation in the national means for efficacy (Ms 3.42-5.86), 
sympathy (Ms 4.54-6.27) and social identification (Ms 4.80-6.03), than there was in guilt (Ms 
2.86-3.78). We systematically constrained the intercept for each of the items and compared it 
to the metric invariance model (above) in which all intercepts were unconstrained. Doing so 
significantly worsened fit for efficacy ∆χ2 (5)=236.31, p < .001, identification, ∆χ2 
(5)=162.02, p < .001, guilt, ∆χ2 (5)=34.17, p < .001 and sympathy, ∆χ2 (5)=149.66, p < .001, 
suggesting that there are indeed differences in the mean levels of each of these items across 
the samples. The results of the tests of scalar invariance suggest that our model based on 
partial metric invariance but with intercepts allowed to be variant (above) is the best fitting 
model (Model 2b, Table 2).  
Residual invariance. Typically residual variance is only calculated if metric and 
scalar invariance have been demonstrated but, for completeness, we tested whether the 
residual variances were the same across samples (residual invariance) by comparing the best-
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fitting partial invariance model to one in which the residual variances were constrained to be 
the same. Overall model fit again was poor, ∆χ2 (24) = 573.61, p <.001, indicating that the 
explained variance for each of the indicators is not the same across samples. We adopted a 
similar logic for our tests of residual invariance to identify which items residuals’ were 
different across samples. We therefore constrained the residuals for each of the items 
(separately) and compared this model to a baseline model in which none of the residuals were 
constrained. Doing so produced poorer fitting models when efficacy was constrained, ∆χ2 
(6)=96.13, p < .001, identification ∆χ2 (6)=234.65, p < .001, guilt ∆χ2 (6)=142.04, p < .001 
and sympathy, ∆χ2 (6)=290.73, p < .001. This pattern of findings suggests that there are 
differences in the explained variance of each of these measures across the samples. The final 
measurement model therefore allowed for all four item residuals to be variant across the 
samples.  
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